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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DANIEL K. RIGGS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970012-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from convictions of three counts of automobile homicide, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (1995), and one count of receiving 
or transferring a stolen vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-
la-1316 (1993). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Was giving the jury a standard flight instruction reversible error where 
defendant's flight was relevant to show that he knew he was intoxicated while driving and 
where the other uncontroverted evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming? 
1 
Standard of Review: The giving of a jury instruction is reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Gibson. 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied. 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 
1996). The instructions, however, must be reviewed "in their entirety to determine whether 
the instructions, when considered as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law." 
Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003,1006 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 
1996). 
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in refusing to suppress defendant's un-Mirandized 
statement to Deputy Stratford, where the statement was spontaneous and not elicited by 
interrogation? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's factual findings underlying the denial of a motion 
to suppress are reviewed for clear error, while the conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. GallL 967 P.2d 930, 933 (Utah 1998). However, because of the 
variability of the factual settings involving whether a statement is the product of a custodial 
interrogation in violation of Miranda.1 the trial court's conclusions on this issue should be 
granted "a measure of discretion." See State v. Levva. 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997) 
(holding that trial court afforded "measure of discretion" in its legal conclusions on whether 
there has been a valid waiver of Miranda rights). 
]Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966). 
2 
Smithson, Lambrou, and James all later died at the hospital from injuries sustained 
in the car accident (R. 08, 1675, 1707-09, 1726, 1739, 1753, 1756-57). 
Motion to Suppress 
The afternoon of the accident, staff at the hospital treating defendant informed police 
that someone had made threats against defendant's life (R. 1123, 1126-27, 1132, 1136, 
1983). Hospital officials were concerned that defendant's family would take defendant from 
the hospital against medical advice (R. 1123, 1126, 1132). Sheriffs Deputy Brad Hunter 
arrived at the hospital at about 3:00 p.m. to guard defendant (R. 1150, 1151-52). When 
defendant asked why the deputy was there, Hunter said he had heard that defendant was 
threatening to leave and he was there to keep defendant at the hospital (R. 1151,1153,1155). 
Deputy Hunter remained in defendant's hospital room for about two to two and one-
half hours (R. 1151, 1156). For about an hour of that time, Deputy Hunter and defendant 
engaged in "general conversation" (R. 1151-52; 1154-55). During this conversation, 
defendant spontaneously remarked that his sister had seen him on the news (R. 495, 1154). 
Deputy Hunter merely responded that he "didn't know much about what happened" (R. 495, 
1154). Defendant also volunteered that he had been "driving a stolen '94 . . . Ford Ranger 
extended cab with some other friends," that they had "passed a cop car. And when he saw 
the cop car somebody told him to go, so he sped up and got approximately [75] miles an hour 
and went through the red light. And that's when the accident happened" (R. 496,1151-52). 
7 
Defendant then boasted that but for the accident, "he probably would have lost the cop" (R. 
496, 1152).6 
Deputy Hunter did not interrogate defendant, nor did he ask defendant any specific 
questions concerning the accident (R. 1150, 1155, 1157, 494). Hunter also did not give 
defendant any Miranda warnings (R. 494, 1156). 
Later that day, Deputy Larry Stratford, the lead investigator of the accident, arrived 
at the hospital "to find out the problem with the threats . . . [and] try and obtain [defendant's] 
side of the story to find out his version of what happened" (R. 1124, 1126, 1133, 1152). 
Hunter was still there (R. 1152, 1124-25). Upon entering the room, Deputy Stratford asked 
if defendant remembered the accident (R. 497,1133,1135). Before defendant could respond, 
a news story about the accident came on the television, and both officers turned to watch the 
report, ignoring defendant (R. 1125, 1135, 497-98). Three to four minutes later, defendant 
blurted out that he "knew the car was stolen before the officer turned his lights on and they 
decided to run from him" (R. 1125, 1134,1135,497). Defendant added that he did not know 
that a gun in the truck was loaded and that he knew nothing about his passengers' 
6The trial court's written findings of fact on these statements suggest that they 
were made after the later arrival of Deputy Stratford (R. 495). Deputy Hunter expressly 
testified, however, that these statements were made while Hunter was alone with 
defendant and that they were made before Deputy Stratford's arrived (R.l 151-52). 
Moreover, the parties' oral arguments and the trial court's oral findings on the motion to 
suppress make clear that both parties and the trial court understood that these statements 
were made only to Hunter and were not part of or the same statements later made to 
Deputy Stratford (R. 1205-06, 1207, 1225-26, 1258-59, 1341, 1343). 
8 
commission of a burglary earlier that evening (R. 1125).7 Stratford formally arrested 
defendant later that evening on some outstanding warrants (R. 1129-30). 
A few days later, Deputy Dirk Roesler conversed casually with defendant while 
guarding him in his hospital room (R. 1138-39). At one point defendant spontaneously 
stated, "I did it; I'm guilty as hell" (R. 1140, 500). Roesler did not question defendant about 
the accident, nor did he give defendant any Miranda warnings (R. 1139-40, 1147, 1148). 
Defendant moved to suppress all his statements to police while he was in the hospital 
on the ground that they were taken in violation of Miranda (R. 40). After conducting a 
lengthy evidentiary hearing and making extensive factual findings, the trial court denied the 
motion (R. 369,460-506). The trial court specifically found that defendant was-in custody 
the entire time he was in the hospital and that he did not receive any Miranda warnings 
before he made any of his statements (R. 1201; 505). The court found none of defendant's 
statements were taken in violation of Miranda, however, because they were voluntary and 
spontaneous and not made in response to an interrogation (R. 495-96,497-98,505-06,1258). 
(The trial court's written findings of fact and conclusions of law are reproduced in 
Addendum B; the court's oral ruling is reproduced in Addendum C). 
Additional relevant facts are included in the argument section. 
7Stratford testified that when defendant began these statements the two deputies 
were not talking with or paying attention to defendant, but were conversing with each 
other (R. 1125-26,1135). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant's flight from the police officer created a legitimate and 
permissible inference that defendant had a consciousness of guilt regarding his level of 
intoxication. This inference was relevant both to the lesser included offense instruction of 
driving while under the influence and to whether defendant had acted with criminal 
negligence with respect to the automobile homicides. The flight instruction was therefore 
proper to inform the jury that defendant's flight was one of many factors that it could 
consider in determining whether defendant was driving while under the influence and his 
level of negligence with respect to the automobile homicides. 
Even if giving the flight instruction was error, it was harmless. When viewed in the 
context of all the instructions, it is unlikely that the flight instruction confused the jury 
regarding the elements it must find to convict defendant or regarding what constituted 
criminal negligence as opposed to simple negligence. Moreover, contrary to defendant's 
assertions, no reasonable view of the uncontroverted facts before the jury would have 
justified a finding that defendant was guilty of only simple negligence. 
Point II: The Court need not reach the merits of defendant's claim that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to Deputy Stratford because any error 
was harmless. Defendant's incriminating statements to Stratford were essentially cumulative 
to the incriminating statements that he made earlier to Deputy Hunter. Since defendant has 
not challenged on appeal the admissibility of his statements to Deputy Hunter, there is no 
10 
reasonable probability that defendant could obtain a more favorable outcome even if he 
prevails on this issue. 
Alternatively, the trial court properly refused to suppress the statements to Deputy 
Stratford because they were not the product of custodial interrogation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FLIGHT INSTRUCTION WAS PROPER IN THIS CASE 
BECAUSE IT WENT TO DEFENDANT'S CONSCIOUSNESS OF 
GUILT THAT HE WAS DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALCOHOL; EVEN IF ERROR, THE INSTRUCTION WAS 
HARMLESS 
The trial court gave the jury the following standard flight instruction: 
The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after the 
commission of a crime or after that person is accused of a crime that has been 
committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish the defendant's guilt. 
However, such flight, if proved, may be considered by you in light of all other 
proven facts in the case in determining guilt or innocence. 
Although consciousness of guilt may be inferred from flight, it does not 
necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged, and there may be reasons 
for flight fully consistent with innocence. Therefore, whether or not evidence 
of flight shows a consciousness of guilt and the significance, if any, to be 
attached to any such evidence are matters exclusively within the province of 
the jury. 
(R. 768; Addendum D). Defendant objected to the instruction on the ground that any 
"flight" occurred before the accident and therefore could not support a finding of 
"consciousness of guilt" for the charged crime of automobile homicide (R. 2167). The trial 
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court ruled that the instruction was proper as the jury could infer from defendant's flight that 
he had a consciousness of guilt that he was intoxicated (R. 2159). 
Defendant renews his argument that because his flight occurred before the accident, 
it could not, as a matter of logic, create an inference that he had a consciousness of guilt of 
automobile homicide. Brief of Appellant [hereinafter "Br. Aplt."] at 10-11. Defendant 
claims that the instruction was prejudicial because it could have caused the jury to 
improperly infer that he "had a consciousness of guilt of automobile homicide" when he fled 
from the police officer and that this could have led the jury to find that defendant acted with 
criminal negligence instead of simple negligence. Br. Aplt. 13. 
The trial court correctly ruled that defendant's flight created a consciousness guilt that 
he was intoxicated. This was a legitimate and logical inference under the facts of this case. 
Although defendant's flight occurred before the deaths, it occurred after the commission of 
the lesser-included offense of driving while under the influence. The instruction was also 
proper with respect to the automobile homicide charges because defendant's consciousness 
of guilt regarding his intoxication while driving was directly related to whether he was acting 
with criminal or simple negligence, an element of the crime charged. Even if giving the 
flight instruction was error, it was at most harmless. 
A. When flight instructions are appropriate. 
Flight instructions, such as the one given in this case, have long been approved when 
they are supported by the evidence. E^g,, State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 574-75 (Utah 1983); 
12 
State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 38-39 (Utah 1987); State v. Gonzalez. 517 P.2d 547, 548 
(Utah 1973): see also State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991). Nevertheless, as this 
Court has explained, flight instructions are proper only when evidence of the flight gives rise 
to a legitimate inference of a "consciousness of guilt" of the crime charged. State v. 
Howland. 761 P.2d 579, 580-81 (UtahApp. 1988): see also Fisher v. Trapp. 748 P.2d 204. 
206-07 (Utah App. 1988) (civil case finding that evidence of flight irrelevant because in that 
case inference of defendant's negligence did not arise from his failure to stop at scene of 
accident). A classic example of when a flight creates an inference of a "consciousness of 
guilt" is if a defendant driving a stolen vehicle flees rather than stopping when signaled by 
police. The flight in that circumstance suggests that the driver knows the vehicle is stolen 
and that his flight is to avoid detection. See, e.g.. Gonzalez. 517 P.2d at 548 (flight 
instruction proper in telling jury that it could consider defendant's flight along with other 
facts in determining guilt for car theft); see also Bales. 678 P.2d at 575 (defendant's flight 
from burglary scene when police arrived justified flight instruction); see generally James. 
819 P.2d at 789 (flight or concealment shows guilty conscious of accused as a result of crime 
committed). 
Defendant correctly points out that an inference of a consciousness of guilt ordinarily 
arises when the flight occurs after the crime has been committed. !See Howland. 761 P.2d 
at 580-81. Thus, in Howland. this Court held that a flight instruction was improper because 
the flight occurred before commission of the crime charged. Id. There, the manager of a 
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fast-food restaurant discovered defendant lurking behind the restaurant by a garbage 
dumpster. Id., at 580. The defendant refused to leave when asked and threatened to kill the 
manager's family. A fist fight ensued until the defendant broke free and ran toward a nearby 
store with the manager in pursuit. The manager caught the defendant outside the store and 
the two wrestled until the manager placed the defendant in a headlock and held him until 
police could arrive. A person arriving at the store saw the defendant pulling a knife from a 
sheath on his belt. As the defendant held the knife five inches out of the sheath, the witness 
grabbed his wrist and pried the knife from his hand. Id 
The Howland jury received a flight instruction similar to the one given in this case.8 
Id. This Court held that it was error to give that instruction "because no flight occurred after 
commission of the crime charged." Id. The Court observed that although it was "arguable 
that a simple assault occurred in the initial encounter at the dumpster," the defendant was 
charged with aggravated assault for using the knife, and not with simple assault arising out 
of the incident by the dumpster. Id The Court reasoned that because no flight occurred after 
8The only significant difference between the two instructions is that the Howland 
instruction did not advise the jury that there may be reasons for flight fully consistent 
with innocence and that even if consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not 
necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged. Howland, 761 P.2d at 580. These 
omissions rendered the flight instruction defective under Bales, 675 P.2d at 575. 
Howland, 761 P.2d at 580 n.l. Defendant acknowledges that the flight instruction in this 
case is a correct one under the law. Br. Aplt. 11 n.5. He challenges only the propriety of 
giving a flight instruction in this case. 
14 
the assault became aggravated, which was the sole crime to be determined by the jury, it was 
error to instruct the jury on flight. Id. at 581. 
The Court's overriding concern in Howland was that a flight instruction must bear 
some logical relationship to the evidence. Id, at 580-81. In other words, the flight to which 
the instruction relates must be susceptible to a legitimate inference of a consciousness of guilt 
with respect to the crime before the jury. Id.; see also Fisher, 748 P.2d at 206-07. The flight 
in Howland bore no such relationship to the crime of aggravated assault, the only crime 
before the jury. 
Nevertheless, Howland plainly implies that if that defendant had been charged with 
the simple assault occurring at the dumpster or if the jury had been given a lesser included 
offense instruction on simple assault, the flight instruction might have been justified. This 
is because the defendant's flight in that case bore a logical relationship to the incident at the 
dumpster, if not to the later aggravated assault. 
The critical question in whether to give a flight instruction, then, is not so much when 
the flight took place as it is to whether the flight gives rise to an inference of a consciousness 
of guilt that is logically related to the crime or crimes before the jury. 
B. The flight instruction was proper in this case. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the flight instruction was proper in this case for two 
reasons. First, the trial court gave the jury a lesser included offense instruction for driving 
while under the influence of alcohol (R. 773, 777, 778, 779, 785, 791). Thus, although 
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defendant was charged only with automobile homicide, the jury was given the option of 
convicting him of the lesser crime of driving under the influence (R. 773, 777, 778, 783). 
Defendant's flight from the police officer gave rise to a legitimate and logical inference that 
defendant fled because he had a consciousness of guilt that he was driving while intoxicated 
and he wished to evade arrest. The flight instruction was thus proper to inform the jury that 
defendant's flight was one among many facts in evidence that it could consider in 
determining whether defendant was guilty of the lesser included offense of driving under the 
influence.9 See Howland. 761 P.2d at 580-81. 
Second, the inference that defendant fled because of a consciousness of guilt 
regarding his intoxication was highly relevant to a finding of guilt on the automobile 
homicide charges, notwithstanding that the flight occurred before the homicides. To convict 
9Defendant argues that a consciousness of his level of intoxication was not an 
appropriate inference because the instruction was not so limited and because there were 
alterative explanations for the flight, such as the fact that defendant was driving a stolen 
truck, there was a loaded gun in the truck, and some of defendant's passengers had been 
involved in a burglary earlier that evening. Br. Aplt. 13. Although it might have been 
better to narrow the instruction, it was not necessary in this case because the only 
reasonable inference the jury could have drawn from the flight here was that defendant 
fled because he did not want to be arrested for driving under the influence. The jury was 
never told that there was a loaded gun in the truck or that there had been a burglary earlier 
(R. 1271-72, 1424-25). The jury was also never explicitly told that the truck was stolen, 
only that the license plates belonged to another vehicle (R. 1391-95, 1424-25, 1684). 
Although the jury sent a note to the judge asking whether the truck was stolen, they were 
instructed to not speculate or consider the status of the truck because it was not relevant to 
their deliberations (R. 806). Consequently, the only rational inference the jury could have 
drawn from the flight was that defendant fled to avoid arrest for driving while under the 
influence. 
16 
defendant of second degree felony automobile homicide, the jury had to find that 1) 
defendant was driving while having a blood alcohol level of .08 per cent or greater or while 
under the influence of alcohol to a degree that he was unable to safely operate the vehicle, 
and 2) defendant caused the death of another by operating the vehicle in a criminally 
negligent manner (R. 773, 780, 786). Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2) (1995). As stated, 
defendant's flight raised a permissible inference that he had a consciousness of guilt with 
respect to his level of intoxication. This was relevant not only to a finding of the first 
element of the automobile homicide charges, but it was also probative to a determination of 
whether defendant's operation of the truck rose to the level of criminal negligence, the 
second element of the charged crimes. The flight suggested that defendant was conscious 
that he was sufficiently under the influence that he should not have been driving. The choice 
to drive despite this knowledge is one of many factors that the jury was entitled to consider 
in determining the level of defendant's negligence. 
In sum, given the high relevance of defendant's flight to the level of his intoxication 
and negligence, it was proper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could consider 
defendant's flight as one of many factors in determining guilt. 
C. Even if erroneous, giving the flight instruction was not prejudicial. 
Even if giving the flight instruction was error, it was not prejudicial because there is 
not a reasonable likelihood that absent the instruction the result would have been any 
different. State v. Brafford, 663 P.2d 68, 70 (Utah 1983) (per curiam) (holding giving of 
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flight instruction harmless in that case); see also State v. Bredehoft. 966 P.2d 285,294 (Utah 
App. 1998) ("harmless error is that "sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable 
likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings"). 
Defendant speculates that the instruction "possibly" confused the jury and caused it 
to infer that defendant had a consciousness of guilt that he had killed three people. Br. Aplt. 
13. Defendant reasons that this in turn might have caused the jury to improperly infer that 
defendant had a knowing mental state, thereby causing the jury to find him guilty of criminal 
negligence instead of simple negligence. Br. Aplt. 13. In other words, defendant claims that 
the flight instruction alone caused the jury to convict him of second degree felony automobile 
homicide instead of the lesser included offense of third degree felony automobile homicide. 
Viewing the jury instructions as a whole renders defendant's argument improbable 
at best. See State v. Ruben. 663 P.2d 445, 449-50 (Utah 1983) ("we have reiterated 
innumerable times one instruction should not be considered in isolation in order to predicate 
a claim of error upon it, but the instructions must be read and understood as a connected 
whole"); Salt Lake Citv v. Smoot 921 P.2d 1003,1006 (Utah App. 1996) (jury instructions 
must be read and viewed in the aggregate). 
First, the idea that the jury would infer from defendant's flight that he knew he had 
killed someone is illogical. Because the only flight in this case occurred before the 
homicides, it would not be rational to assume that defendant fled because he felt guilty about 
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killing someone. Thus, it wo.ild be highly improbable that any of the jurors would make 
such an inference. 
Second, the flight instruction itself made clear that the flight was "not sufficient in 
itself to establish the defendant's guilt" (R. 768). Rather, the flight, "if proved, may be 
considered by you in light of all other proven facts in the case in determining guilt or 
innocence" (R. 768). The flight instruction also explained that even though a "consciousness 
of guilt may be inferred from flight, it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime 
charged," but that "there may be reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence" (R. 768). 
The instruction further explained that the jury was the exclusive judge of what significance, 
if any to be attached to the flight (R. 768). In other words, the jury was expressly told that 
evidence of defendant's flight was not conclusive, or even presumptive, evidence of 
defendant's guilt, but was only one of many factors that jury could consider in reaching a 
verdict. 
The jury was also instructed that to convict defendant of second degree felony 
automobile homicide, it must find that defendant operated the vehicle in a criminally 
negligent manner in addition to his being intoxicated (R. 773,780,786). The jury was given 
the option of convicting defendant of third degree felony automobile homicide, if it found 
that defendant had acted with only simple negligence as opposed to criminal negligence (R. 
773, 776, 782, 788). 
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The instructions carefully defined the differences between criminal and simple 
negligence (R. 792, 793). The jury was instructed that the level of negligence must be 
determined "in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint" (R. 792, 793). 
The instructions also informed the jury that the level of defendant's negligence was a distinct 
and separate element from the element of driving while under the influence and that even if. 
the jury determined that defendant was driving while intoxicated, it "must also consider 
separately whether he acted in a negligent or criminally negligent manner which caused a 
death" (R. 794). 
The instructions stated that it was unlawful to refuse to stop or to flee when a police 
officer gives a visual or audible signal to stop (R. 766), and that the law requires drivers to 
keep a "proper lookout" (R. 795). The instructions further explained that although "violation 
of a statute can be evidence of simple negligence or criminal negligence," the jury served as 
the "exclusive judges of weight to which the evidence is entitled (R. 767). The jury was also 
told to disregard any inapplicable instruction (R. 797) and not to place emphasis on any 
single instruction, but to read and apply the instructions as a whole (R. 800). The flight 
instruction was one of fifty instructions (R. 768, 744-804). 
In view of the other instructions, none of which is challenged by defendant, it is 
unlikely that the flight instruction alone confused the jury regarding the difference between 
criminal and simple negligence and what it needed to find to properly convict defendant. 
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Even without regard to the other instructions, no reasonable view of the evidence in 
this case would have justified the jury in finding defendant guilty of only simple negligence 
as opposed to criminal negligence. The jury was correctly instructed that a person acts with 
criminal negligence 
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (1995); (R. 792). In contrast, the jury was told that "simple 
negligence" is simply "the failure to exercise that degree of care that a reasonable and 
prudent person exercise under like or similar circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
207(l)(b);(R.793). 
The uncontroverted evidence showed that defendant was driving with a blood alcohol 
level of almost twice the legal limit (R. 1962-63,1939). Although signaled by police to pull 
over, he chose instead to flee, first by driving over two residential lawns, and then by 
recklessly speeding through a residential area 55 mph over the speed limit (R. 1686-93, 
1828-30). While it is true that defendant braked slightly before the intersection, he then 
accelerated through the red light (R. 1692-93, 1831-32, 1834). Defendant himself 
acknowledged to Deputy Hunter that he had reached a speed of 75 mph when he went 
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through the red light and that but for the accident, "he probably would have lost the cop" (R. 
496; 1151-52). 
Nothing in these facts suggest that defendant's conduct constituted mere simple 
negligence. Rather, these facts conclusively add up to a "gross deviation" from the standard 
of care that would have been exercised by an ordinary person under the same circumstances. 
That gross deviation resulted in a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a violent accident 
would occur and that three people would be killed. 
Thus, giving the flight instruction, even if error, was harmless.10 
10Relying on Francis v. Franklin, 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985), defendant makes an 
alternative argument that the flight instruction violated his Due Process rights under the 
federal constitution because it created a "permissive inference" that was not justified by 
"reason and common sense." Br. Aplt. 13-15. Defendant contends that the instruction 
therefore presented a constitutional error requiring the State to show harmlessness beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Br. Aplt. 15. 
Defendant's reliance on Francis is misplaced. That case dealt with a jury 
instruction that created a mandatory presumption regarding the murder defendant's intent. 
Id. at 1974. The Court held that such an instruction erroneously shifts the constitutional 
burden of proof from the State to the defendant. IcL at 1971-73. The Court distinguished 
instructions that create mandatory presumptions from those that merely create a 
permissive inference: "A permissive inference suggests to the jury a possible conclusion 
to be drawn if the State proves predicate facts, but does not require the jury to draw that 
conclusion." Id at 1971. The Court explained that a permissive inference does not 
relieve the State of its burden of persuasion and therefore "violates the Due Process 
Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify 
in light of the proven facts before the jury." Id. 
Defendant does not contend that the instruction at issue here created a mandatory 
presumption. See Bellmore v. State, 602N.E.2d 111, 119 (Ind. 1992) (quotingFrancis, 
417 U.S. at 315, 105 S.Ct. at 1971) (similar flight instruction "could not 'reasonably have 
been understood as creating a presumption that relieves the State of its burden of 
persuasion on an element of the offense'"). Moreover, as already explained, the flight 
instruction did not create an unjustifiable "permissive inference," because under the facts 
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POINT II 
DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS 
STATEMENTS TO DEPUTY STRATFORD WAS HARMLESS; 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT REASONABLY 
CONCLUDED THAT DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS TO DEPUTY 
STRATFORD WAS NOT IN RESPONSE TO INTERROGATION 
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress with respect to all his statements 
to Deputies Stratford, Hunter, and Roesler (R. 369,495-96, 597-98, 505,1258). On appeal, 
defendant challenges only the denial of his motion to suppress with respect to his 
incriminating statements to Deputy Stratford. Br. Aplt. 15-24. Defendant contends that the 
trial court erroneously found that his statements to Deputy Stratford were not the result of 
custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda. Br. Aplt. 17-24.11 
of this case the jury could reasonably and rationally infer that defendant fled from police 
because he wished to avoid arrest for driving while under the influence. Furthermore, the 
flight instruction in this case would not have caused the jury to infer that defendant was 
guilty solely because he had a "consciousness of automobile homicide." The instruction 
expressly stated that the jury could not infer guilt solely from the fact of flight (R. 768). 
In addition, the jury would not have inferred that defendant fled because he felt guilty 
over the homicides because the accident had not yet happened. Finally, the flight 
instruction was not such, when viewed in the context of all the instructions, that the jury 
would have misunderstood or been confused regarding the elements that it had to find to 
convict defendant of second degree felony automobile homicide. 
In any event, as explained above, any error was harmless, even beyond a 
reasonable doubt, because under the facts of this case the jury could not have reasonably 
found defendant guilty only of simple negligence. 
1
 defendant's challenge to the admissibility of his statements is relevant only to his 
conditional guilty plea to receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle. Br. Aplt. 15 n.7. 
Thus, resolution of this issue does not affect defendant's convictions for automobile 
homicide. 
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This Court should affirm defendant's guilty plea because even if his statements to 
Deputy Stratford should have been suppressed, the failure to do so was harmless. In any 
event, the trial court reasonably determined that defendant's statement was spontaneous and 
not in response to any interrogation. 
A. Failure to suppress defendant's statements to Deputy Stratford was harmless. 
Defendant made three incriminating statements to Deputy Stratford: 1) defendant 
knew the car was stolen before the officer had turned his lights on and "they decided to run 
from him;" 2) defendant did not know the gun was loaded and that one of the passengers had 
brought it; and 3) defendant was just taking his passengers home and knew nothing about the 
burglary that his passengers had committed earlier (R. 1125). Because the second and third 
statements do not relate in any way to the receiving the motor vehicle charge, the sole 
statement at issue here is defendant's first statement, that defendant knew the red pickup 
truck was stolen. 
The Court need not reach the merits of defendant's claim of a Miranda violation 
because the refusal to suppress that statement was harmless. See State v. White, 851 P.2d 
1195, 1201 (Utah App. 1993) (refusing to reach merits of defendant's defective warrant 
claim where any error was harmless). Before Deputy Stratford arrived at the hospital, 
defendant had already admitted to Deputy Hunter that at the time of the accident he had been 
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"driving a stolen '94 Ford Ranger extended cab" (R. 495-96, 1151-52) (emphasis added).12 
This was in substance the same incriminating statement later made to Stratford that defendant 
now challenges. Defendant, however, has not challenged on appeal any of the statements 
that he made to Deputy Hunter. Br. Aplt. 15-24. Consequently, even if the statement to 
Deputy Stratford had been suppressed, there is not a reasonable probability that defendant 
could expect a better outcome because the same statement would be admissible through 
Deputy Hunter. See State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1274 (Utah App. 1996). 
Citing to Lindgren, defendant asserts that "[n]o harmful error analysis is possible" in 
the conditional plea context. Br. Aplt. 24. Defendant misapprehends Lindgren's holding. 
That case expressly held that a harmless error analysis is applicable in conditional plea cases. 
Lindgren entered a guilty plea to aggravated sexual abuse of a child conditioned upon his 
right to appeal the trial court's pretrial evidentiary ruling excluding evidence critical to the 
defense. Id at 1270-71. After ruling that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence, this 
Court noted that it would "reverse only if the error were harmful" Id at 1273. The Court 
explained that a finding of harmlessness required an appellate court "to determine from the 
record what evidence would have been before the jury absent the trial court's error." Id at 
1274. The Court then concluded that it could not tell whether the error was harmless in that 
case because the record was not adequate for such a determination. Id This was because 
12See footnote 6, supra. 
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after the trial court had made its evidentiary ruling, Lindgren entered his conditional plea and 
there was no trial or other evidentiary hearing to develop the facts that would have been 
presented to the jury. Id. 
Lindgren, then, did not create a per se rule that a harmless error analysis never applies 
or is impossible in a conditional plea case. Rather, it held that a harmless error analysis was 
proper in the conditional plea context so long as the record was adequate to allow an 
appellate court to assess harmlessness. Id. at 1274. See also State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 
1017 (Utah App. 1993) (finding admission ofpre-Miranda statement harmless in conditional 
guilty plea case where court already determined that substantially similar second, post-
Miranda statement was admissible); White, 851 P.2d at 1196,1201 (applying harmless error 
analysis to one of defendant's claims on appeal from conditional guilty plea). 
Unlike the record in Lindgren, the record in this case is more than adequate to 
determine that not suppressing defendant's statement to Deputy Stratford was harmless.13 
13The standard for determining whether nonconstitutional error is harmful is 
whether "'absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable 
to the defendant.'" Lindgren, 910 P.2d at 1273 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1221 (Utah 1993)); State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1213 n.12 (Utah 1989). Constitutional 
error is reviewed under a "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. State v. 
Villareal, 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 1995); State v. Genovisi, 909 P.2d 916, 922 (Utah 
App. 1995). Here, defendant has not claimed that his statement was coerced in violation 
of his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. He argues only that 
his statement was taken in violation of Miranda. The Utah Supreme Court has held that a 
noncoercive Miranda violation such as occurred here does not equate with a constitutional 
violation. State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah 1995). Because defendant has not 
made a constitutional claim, (and indeed the facts do not support such a claim) the 
appropriate standard is whether absent the claimed error there would have been a 
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The facts that would have been before the jury had this charge gone to trial were not only 
explained in the probable cause statement of the information, but they were also fully 
developed at the trial on the automobile homicide charges and at the motion to suppress 
hearing. The information alleged that the truck had been stolen from its owner and that the 
owner would testify that defendant did not have the owner's permission to drive the truck (R. 
08-09). It was uncontroverted at the suppression hearing and at trial that the plates on the 
truck belonged to another vehicle, suggesting that the truck was stolen (R. 996,1684). It was 
also uncontroverted that defendant fled Officer Bairett, suggesting that defendant had a 
"consciousness of guilt" that the truck was stolen (R. 997-1002,1684-93). Finally, and most 
importantly, because defendant has not challenged the admissibility of defendant's statement 
to Deputy Hunter, the jury would have heard that defendant told Deputy Hunter that he was 
driving a stolen truck at the time of the accident (R. 1151-52, 1210). Thus, at most, 
defendant's statement to Deputy Stratford was merely cumulative to the one he made to 
Deputy Hunter. 
Given the foregoing evidence and defendant's incriminating statement to Deputy 
Hunter, the failure to suppress defendant's incriminating statement to Deputy Stratford was 
harmless, even beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Kiriluk, amended opinion, slip op. 
no. 971200-CA at 4-5, ffl[ 11, 12 (Utah App. February 11, 1999) (defendant's statements 
reasonable probability of a different outcome. Nevertheless, as explained below, any 
error in this case meets the harmlessness criteria under both standards. 
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allegedly taken in violation of Miranda harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where 
statements were primarily cumulative); James, 85 8 P.2d at 1017 (harmless error to admit first 
pre-Miranda statement because it was merely cumulative to second, properly admitted post-
Miranda statement). 
B. Defendant's statement was not the product of interrogation. 
If the Court reaches the merits of this issue, it should affirm the denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress because, as the trial court ruled, the statement to Deputy Stratford was 
not the product of custodial interrogation. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that "the prosecution may not use 
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the 
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the 
privilege against self-incrimination." 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966). The 
Miranda Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] 
freedom of action in any significant way." IcL 
In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Supreme Court further clarified the meaning of 
"interrogation" as "either express questioning or its functional equivalent." 446 U.S. 291, 
300-01,100 S.Ct. 1682,1689-90. In other words, "the term 'interrogation* under Miranda 
refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the 
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police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know 
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id 
Both the Miranda and Innis decisions recognized that not "all statements obtained by 
the police after a person has been taken into custody are to be considered the product of 
interrogation;' Innis. 446 U.S. at 300,100 S.Ct. at 1689; Miranda. 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 
at 1630. Rather, "'[interrogation,' as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect 
a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself." Innis, 446 U.S. 
at 300, 100 S.Ct. at 1689. Moreover, "fvjolunteered statements of any kind are not barred 
by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by [the Miranda decision]." 
Id (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630) (emphasis added). 
Thus, for a statement made without Miranda warnings to be inadmissible, it must "be 
established that a suspect's incriminating response was the product o/words or actions on 
the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response." Innis, 446 U.S. at 303, 100 S.Ct. at 1691 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, statements that are not the product of interrogation, but which are volunteered 
are admissible. See, e.g.. State v. Dutchie, 969 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1998) (detective's 
request for background information not interrogation, therefore defendant's voluntary and 
spontaneous statements admissible); State v. Hales. 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993) 
(telling defendant that he was under arrest was not interrogation, therefore his spontaneous, 
voluntary utterance was not product of interrogation). 
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Plainly, an accused's volunteered statements cannot be the product of interrogation 
in the absence of interrogation or its functional equivalent. For example, a defendant's 
unsolicited incriminating chatter to police transporting him to jail are not the product of 
interrogation where officers did not question defendant, but merely agreed with his 
statements. Rg,, State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534, (Utah App. 1997) (finding defendant's 
statements voluntary and spontaneous where transporting police office did not "interrogate" 
defendant); see also Dutchie, 969 P.2d at 426 (defendant's statements not product of 
interrogation where police merely asked for background information and stated words 
normally attendant to arrest); Hales, 860 P.2d at 972 (announcing that defendant was under 
arrest was not interrogation, therefore defendant's statements not product of interrogation); 
McGowan v. Miller. 109 F.3d 1168, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997) (where defendant initiated 
conversation with police, his statements were volunteered and not product of interrogation). 
The fact that a statement is made during a custodial interrogation, however, does not 
necessarily mean that the statement results from or is the product of the interrogation. The 
Eleventh Circuit held that a statement during custodial interrogation may nevertheless be 
admissible under Miranda if the statement was spontaneous and was not responsive to the 
question asked. United States v. Castro. 723 F.2d 1527, 1530-31 (11th Cir. 1984). In that 
case, a customs officer investigating possible drug activity held the defendant at gun point 
and, without giving Miranda warnings, asked, "What in the world is going on here?" The 
defendant responded, "You want money? We got money." Id. at 1529. The court held that 
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the officer's question in that case amounted u* a custodial interrogation. LI at 1530. The 
court determined that defendant's response was not barred by Miranda, however, because it 
was "spontaneously volunteered and totally unresponsive to the officer's question."14 Id. at 
1530. See also United States v. Thomas, 961 F. Supp. 43,45-46 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding 
that even if question asked of defendant were in form of custodial interrogation, defendant's 
response was still admissible under Miranda because it was not responsive to the question); 
State v. Mitchell. 482 N.W.2d 364,687-88 (Wis. 1988) (even though defendant was subject 
to custodial interrogation, his conduct of walking to car and attempting to conceal a bag of 
cocaine, while testimonial in nature, was non-responsive to officer's question and therefore 
admissible). 
Here, the State conceded below, and the trial court found, that defendant was in 
custody during the time he was in the hospital (R. 1205; 505). There is no dispute that 
defendant received no Miranda warnings before any of his statements to any of the officers. 
The only question before this Court is whether defendant's statement to Deputy Stratford was 
the product of interrogation. As explained below, it was not, first because the deputy's sole 
14The Castro decision rested in part on the proposition that "[a]n attempt to commit 
another crime designed to interfere with a police officer's carrying out of his duties 
simply must be beyond the Intent of Miranda." Id. at 1530-31. The primary thrust of the 
opinion, however, is that the defendant's statement was "not responsive to any 
interrogation." Id. at 1532. The court concluded that suppression of this "unresponsive 
statement would be in direct conflict with the very fountainhead of Miranda," which 
expressly held that "'[voluntary statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth 
Amendment nor has their admissibility been affected by the Miranda decision or its 
progeny.'" LI at 1532 (quoting Miranda. 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1629). 
31 
question to defendant did not constitute interrogation, and second because even if defendant 
was subject to custodial interrogation, his statement was not in response to, and therefore not 
the product of, any interrogation. 
1. The deputy's question was not interrogation. 
It is undisputed that upon arriving at the hospital, Deputy Stratford asked defendant 
only one question, "Do you remember the accident?" (R. 238,1133,1135,1258). The trial 
court correctly concluded that this question did not constitute interrogation because it was 
not "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Innis, 446 U.S. at 303,100 S.Ct. 
at 1691. 
The likelihood that a question will elicit an incriminating response is determined from 
all the circumstances. Lavton City v. Aragon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah App. 1991). 
"Although the subjective intent of police in asking the question is relevant, the main focus 
is on whether the suspect is likely to incriminate himself or herself in response." kL 
(citations omitted). 
Although Deputy Stratford admitted that he was interested in obtaining defendant's 
side of the story (R. 1124, 1132-33), his question was not one that called for, or even 
anticipated, an incriminating response. It simply asked for a "yes" or "no." Significantly, 
the question did not call for the responses that defendant ultimately gave, i.e., that he knew 
the truck was stolen before he ran from police, that he did not know a gun in the truck was 
loaded, and that he knew nothing about an earlier burglary committed by some of his 
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passengers. The question asked whether defendant remembered the accident. On its face, 
it did not seek to elicit any information regarding any of the crimes that defendant eventually 
volunteered. 
Moreover, in the context of this case, the question may have been a preliminary 
question calculated not just to obtain defendant's side of the story, but also to first ascertain 
defendant's mental processes. Deputy Stratford testified that he had tried to talk to defendant 
earlier in the day, but that defendant had been "nonrespondent" (R. 1133). It is reasonable 
under these circumstances to conclude that before specifically questioning defendant about 
the accident, Deputy Stratford may have first wanted to determine whether defendant had the 
capacity to answer any questions. Preliminary questions such as this one that merely seek 
background information or to assess whether the subject is in a condition to be questioned 
are not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. See Dutchie, 969 P.2d at 426-27 
(officer's questions regarding suspects name, address, age, height, weight, education, 
employment, personal goals, and medications were not likely to elicit incriminating 
responses, but were mere requests for background information that could assist the officer 
in assessing the suspect's capacity to be questioned and to validly waive Miranda rights).15 
15It is entirely possible that if defendant had simply replied that he did remember 
the accident that Deputy Stratford would have then given him Miranda warnings before 
asking any other questions. Unfortunately, the record is silent as to this point. 
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Because Deputy Stratford's single question was not reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response, it was not interrogation for purposes of Miranda. The trial court 
therefore correctly refused to suppress the statement.16 
2. Defendant's statement was non-responsive to the deputy's question. 
Even assuming that Deputy Stratford's question did amount to interrogation, 
defendant's statement was not the product of that interrogation. Rather, as the trial court 
found, defendant's statement was not responsive to the question asked, but was 
"spontaneously volunteered" (R. 498, 506). 
The trial court's finding on this point was not clearly erroneous, but was fully 
supported by the evidence. The uncontroverted facts before the trial court were that 
defendant did not immediately respond to Deputy Stratford's question (R. 1134-35). Instead, 
as soon as the question was asked, the attention of defendant, Stratford, and Hunter were all 
distracted by a newscast about the accident (R. 1134-25). For three to four minutes the three 
men watched the newscast, saying nothing to each other (R. 1134-35). Then, without any 
prompting from the deputies, defendant simply volunteered that he knew the truck was stolen 
when he fled, that he did not know the gun was loaded, and that he knew nothing about an 
16Defendant suggests in his brief that the newscast, in conjunction with Deputy 
Stratford's question, constituted interrogation. Br. Aplt. 21, 23. Defendant cites to no 
authority for this novel proposition. Interrogation requires some action on the part of 
police. The newscast simply did not constitute police action let alone questioning or its 
functional equivalent that was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from 
defendant. Neither is there anything in the record to suggest that Deputy Stratford used 
the newscast in any way. 
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earlier burglary (R. 1133-35). None of these statements answered the original question and 
all were totally non-responsive to the question. Indeed, under the peculiar circumstances of 
this case, it appears that the statements were made in response to the newscast, and not to 
Deputy Stratford's question four minutes earlier. 
Defendant nevertheless argues that the trial court's finding that defendant's statements 
were spontaneous and not in response to the deputy's question was clearly erroneous or 
against the great weight of the evidence. Br. Aplt. 17-19. In making this claim, defendant 
points to Deputy Stratford's testimony on cross-examination that seemingly contradicts his 
direct testimony that defendant's statement was spontaneous.17 Br. Aplt. 18. Defendant 
contends that the trial court "provided no persuasive reason why Deputy Stratford's 
conflicting testimony should be resolved in favor of a finding of spontaneity," and argues 
that the trial court should have resolved the conflict in favor of defendant. Br. Aplt. 19. 
1
 Specifically, defendant relies on the following colloquy: 
Q [by defense counsel]: And you asked him follow-up questions 
about what he remembered about the accident. Correct? 
A: I asked him if he remembered the accident so I could find out his side of 
the story, yeah. 
Q: And my next question is, he responded to that. Correct? 
A: Yes, uh-huh. 
Q: And you asked follow-up questions to try and get some more details 
from him, did you not? 
A: I don't recall if asked any other follow-up questions or not. The 
information that he gave me gave me brief sketch of his side of the story. I 
don't know if anything - 1 tried to clarify anything in that. I can't recall. 
(R. 1133-34). 
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Defendant's argument erroneously assumes that Deputy Stratford's testimony was 
inherently contradictory and that this was the only evidence upon which the trial court could 
find that defendant's statements were voluntary and non-responsive to any questions. A 
review of Deputy Stratford's entire testimony demonstrates that his testimony was not 
internally contradictory. Stratford consistently testified that he only asked defendant whether 
he remembered the accident and that defendant said nothing for three to four minutes while 
they all watched the newscast (R. 1133-35). 
While Stratford may have wavered on his characterization of defendant's statement 
as being either "spontaneous" or "responsive," the trial court was not bound by either 
characterization. That determination was to be made by the trial court based on the totality 
of the circumstances. The time lapse between the deputy's question and defendant's 
response, the intervening newscast, as well as the non-responsiveness of defendant's answer 
were all factors that supported the trial court's ultimate finding that defendant's statements 
were not in response to Deputy Stratford's question, but were spontaneous statements. 
Because the trial court reasonably concluded that defendant's statement to Deputy 
Stratford was not the product of custodial interrogation, the statements were admissible.18 
18Defendant alternatively argues that even if the trial court correctly found that his 
statement was not spontaneous, "the State still failed to show that [his] statement was 
sufficiently attenuated from the prior illegal questioning." Br. Aplt. 19. Defendant has 
waived this argument because he did not make it below. See State v. Schweitzer, 943 
P.2d 649, 654 n. 3 (Utah App. 1997) (declining to review issue raised for first time on 
appeal); State v. Beltran-Felix. 922 P.2d 30, 33 (Utah App. 1996) (declining to review 
argument not raised below). (continued . . . . ) 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions for automobile homicide and his guilty plea for receiving or transferring a stolen 
vehicle. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ f f d a y of J2^U^ . 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
/ Z A U R A B. DUPAIX ' 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
( . . . continued). 
In any event, a separate attenuation analysis is unnecessary here. Defendant 
argues that his statements to Deputy Stratford were obtained "by direct exploitation of the 
illegal questioning" because "there was a minimal passage of time [between the question 
and answer], no change in location, and no change in identity of the interrogator." Br. 
Aplt. 21. Defendant's attenuation argument is really just another way of saying that his 
incriminating statement was the product of custodial interrogation from Deputy Stratford 
without the benefit of Miranda warnings. The State agrees that the time between the 
question and answer and whether there were any intervening events are factors to be 
considered in determining whether defendant's statement was the product of custodial 
interrogation. However, for the reasons already stated, defendant's statements were not 
the product of custodial interrogation: there was only one question, there were three to 
four minutes between the question and the answer, the newscast was an intervening event 
between the question and answer, and the statement was not responsive to the question 
asked. 
To the extent that defendant's attenuation argument suggests that his statement 
was the product of coercive police tactics, that claim is wholly without merit. There is no 
evidence that police brought any pressure to bear on defendant at any time. Deputy 
Stratford asked only one question and instead of demanding an immediate answer, turned 
to watch a newscast. Asking one non-threatening, non-accusatory question in a hospital 
setting simply does not rise to the level of coercion. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Statutes 
76-5-207. Automobile homicide. 
(1) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if 
the actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of 
.08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that 
renders the actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the 
death of another by operating the vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "negligent" means simple negli-
gence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and 
prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if 
the actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of 
.08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that 
renders the actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the 
death of another by operating the motor vehicle in a criminally negligent 
manner. 
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "criminally negligent" means 
criminal negligence as defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4). 
(3) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section 
41-6-44.3 and the provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as 
provided by Section 41-6-44.5 apply to determination and proof of blood alcohol 
content under this section. 
(4) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood is based upon grams of alcohol 
per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood. 
(5) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is on or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense to any charge of 
violating this section. 
(6) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content 
is admissible except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
(7) For purposes of this section, "motor vehicle" means any self-propelled 
vehicle and includes any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine, 
watercraft, or aircraft. 
76-2-103- Definitions of intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; 
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negli-
gence or criminally negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of 
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surround-
ing his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when 
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
4Ma-1316. Receiving or transferring stolen motor vehi-
cle, trailer, or semitrailer — Penalty. 
It is a second degree felony for a person: 
(1) with intent to procure or pass title to a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or 
unlawfully taken to receive or transfer possession of the motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer from or to another; or 
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer 
that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully 
taken if he is not a peace officer engaged at the time in the performance of 
his duty. 
ADDENDUM B 
Trial Court's Written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
on Motion to Suppress 
rHirH InrlidalOistrict 
JUN 2J1996 
Deoutv Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DANIEL K. RIGGS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 961900273 
JUDGE ANNE M. STIRBA 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
two motions of defendant, Daniel K. Riggs: (1) "Motion to Suppress 
Blood Draw Evidence" and (2) "Motion to Suppress Defendant's 
Statements". 
On April 26, 1996, an evidentiary hearing on the two motions 
was held before the Court at which time the defendant was present 
and represented by counsel Lisa J. Remal and Susanne Gustin-Furgis, 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association. The State of Utah was 
represented by Kenneth R. Updegrove, Deputy District Attorney. At 
the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Court ordered 
additional briefing and scheduled oral argument by the parties on 
May 10, 1996. 
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At the May 10 oral argument/ the defendant was again present 
and represented by Ms. Remal and Ms. Gustin-Furgis. Additionally, 
Ralph Dellapiana, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, also argued 
in behalf of the defendant. The State of Utah was again 
represented by Mr. Updegrove. At the conclusion of the oral 
argument, the Court ruled from the bench on all issues and ordered 
Mr. Updegrove to prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law.1 
thereafter, defendant's counsel received the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and submitted written objections to them. At a hearing on June 4, 1996, attended by the defendant 
and counsel for both parties, the Court ruled on the objections and proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. A second draft of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law was then 
prepared. The Court has now carefully reviewed the second draft, re-read the transcript of the 
suppression hearing, made numerous changes to the second draft and hereby renders these findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. 
Because of limitations of time and resources, the Court has not specified the various citations 
to the suppression hearing transcript to which the findings correspond. Indeed, evidence regarding 
certain events such as, for example, the probable cause evidence known by a particular officer at a 
particular time, may be addressed at several different places throughout the transcript according to 
what the officer himself said and also to what other officers said they told to the officer. 
Further, specific findings may vary somewhat from the exact language used by a witness at 
one location in the transcript. Where this occurs, the variation results from the Court's review of all 
of the evidence concerning the subject matter addressed, the weight of the evidence, the inferences 
that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, if appropriate, and the reasonable reconciliation of 
conflicts in the evidence, if appropriate. Thus, consideration of all of the evidence has been given in 
rendering these findings of fact. 
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DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS 
A. Blood Draw Test Results 
Turning first to the defendant's claims regarding the blood 
draw evidence, he seeks to suppress two different blood alcohol 
test results of blood drawn from him: (1) the "state-analyzed" 
blood drawn by the State's phlebotomist, Bryan Davis ("Mr. Davis")/ 
and analyzed by the State's toxicologist, Bruce Beck ("Mr. Beck"); 
and (2) the "hospital-analyzed" blood drawn by Mr. Davis at the 
request of Pioneer Hospital and analyzed by the Pioneer Valley 
Hospital Laboratory. 
As to the state-analyzed blood, the defendant claims the blood 
alcohol results of the defendant's blood samples are inadmissible 
because (1) the defendant was not under arrest and did not give his 
consent to his blood being drawn, the blood draw constitutes an 
unconstitutional search under both the United States Constitution 
and the Constitution of the State of Utah; (2) the chain of custody 
of the state-analyzed blood was defective; (3) the manner in which 
the state-analyzed blood was stored by Mr. Davis and stored and 
tested by Mr. Beck; and (4) only the law enforcement officer who 
was present at the hospital with the defendant could have ordered 
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the defendant's blood to be drawn, and he did not have probable 
cause to do so.2 
As to the hospital-analyzed blood, the defendant claims the 
blood alcohol results are inadmissible because (1) the blood draw 
constitutes an unconstitutional search; and (2) the results 
constitute privileged information under the physician-patient 
provisions of Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
B. Defendant's Alleged Statements 
Defendant has also moved to suppress incriminating statements 
he allegedly made to different law enforcement officers on several 
different occasions on the grounds that (1) these statements were 
taken in violation of his rights under the United States 
Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah; and (2) 
because of the injuries he received in the automobile collision and 
resulting medical treatment, any such statements made by him were 
made neither knowingly nor voluntarily. 
C. Burden of Proof 
It is undisputed that the State of Utah has the burden of 
proof in this proceedings. 
2The Court has by its Memorandum Decision dated May 17, 1996, resolved this issue. 
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The Court, having considered the weight ^' 
documentary evidence, the cr^dihi 1 i tv of t: e- witnesses, the 
inferences that cai i reasons. . '-** e I he 
written and oral ai juments of all counsel, - i oecause good cause 
fact, 
conclusions of law * -:der. 
1: 11 (DINGS OF FACT 
Defendant " i chargorl by Information with Count Tlf 
Criminal Homicide, Automobi.lci Homic'do- rounf "". Criminal 
Homicide, Automo!, v. Homicide, _-. ?, 
Automobile <: "licid* -.d Coun' Receiving r Transferrin 
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2200 West 540u iuui;i, Scu . i..i,v. . u.». . , > . «.<_ v : _ a h . 
.WAY PATROI *w-w-.«.v _AV— BARRETT 
Q
 On November id. i
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on patrol duty, Utah Kiohwav Patrol Trooper David Bair - * ("Trooper 
B a i r e 11 * J ) \ i a s s L o p j »< M : 1: I 
Redwood Road, Sal" Lake County, State r n. 
4. ". • - h'rl prit'rul "ohirle then faced west. 
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5. Trooper Bairett noticed a red Ford pickup truck 
("pickup7') approach him from the rear at a high rate of speed. 
6. The pickup stopped at the red light in the lane next to 
Trooper Bairett. 
7. Trooper Bairett looked at the driver of the pickup from 
a distance of approximately eight to ten feet. 
8. The lighting was sufficient for Trooper Bairett to see 
the features of the driver of the pickup. 
9. When the light turned green, the pickup proceeded west 
across Redwood Road at approximately 25 miles per hour. 
1.0. The speed limit on 5400 South at that location is 45 
miles per hour. 
11. Trooper Bairett slowed his patrol vehicle so that the 
driver of the pickup was forced to proceed ahead of Trooper 
Bairett. 
12. Trooper Bairett was able to observe that the registration 
on the pickup's rear license plate had expired. 
13. Trooper Bairett read the license plate number to Dispatch 
and was subsequently informed that the plate was not registered to 
the pickup. 
14. Trooper Bairett decided to stop the pickup. 
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24. Trooper Bairett proceeded northbound after the pickup; 
however, even at a speed of approximately 75 miles per hour, 
Trooper Bairett was unable to narrow substantially the distance 
between him and the pickup. 
25. Trooper Bairett observed that the traffic control signal 
ahead of the pickup at the intersection of 5400 South and 2200 West 
was red. 
26. Based upon his experience that most vehicles slow at red 
lights and because he observed the pickup's brake lights come on 
briefly, Trooper Bairett thought the pickup would stop at the red 
light. 
27. However, the pickup did not stop; instead, it entered the 
intersection when the light facing it was red. 
28. As the pickup entered the intersection, Trooper Bairett 
was located approximately 150 yards to the south on 2200 West. 
29. As the pickup entered the intersection northbound, a 
Saturn passenger vehicle entered the intersection westbound at a 
speed of approximately 40 miles per hour. 
30. The pickup and Saturn collided near the middle of the 
intersection. 
0 0 0 4 6 7 
STATE V. RIGGS PAGE NINE FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
mhe force ~* 4~1" -1 — -*ct caused *"^ r.. up tn i 
came iu C uuwn ^c f ^ r 
,w
 waturn crasi.ea 
rest. 
* i. 'I'l'ooper B tireU p»,"ceeded dirp^My t'o the collision scene 
and radioed for assistanre from the Sail Lake County Sheriff's 
i" * e . 
Trooper Bairett observed considarab 1 e dabris fi: Dr i !:  1 : = • 
collision. 
~ r o o p e r b ^ i i t l ' i ' m i o p u i i - ' l I > • - • ' '•• 
intersection, 
l e a r window of 
the pickup. 
1
 ^ Lt too' ~ uat male J_HU -^siody, handcuffed 
him diiu places ..* Jron*" ^ -e patrol ve:.. . e. 
^ . *~
r
 -*•=•' '-airett also observer :: dividual he had 
earlier £•„ _. 
passenger sioe c' pside-down pickup. 
:i • ::i e i : 1: i f i e d t h e in a n h e had seen d r i v' ^  q 
the pickup a' - i« i^uu; redwood Road as the defendant, Danie' 
II In, it a 
STATE V. RIGGS PAGE TEN FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
40. Trooper Bairett noticed the defendant had a head injury 
which was bleeding, but not profusely. 
41. To Trooper Bairett, the defendant appeared to be in 
shock. 
42. The defendant mumbled, answered questions and made 
statements. 
43. Later, while the defendant was still at the collision 
scene, it appeared to Trooper Bairett that the defendant's 
condition improved. 
44. Trooper Bairett detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage 
coming from the defendant. 
45. Trooper Bairett acknowledged that a head injury can cause 
someone to appear intoxicated and yet not be; however, because of 
the defendant's appearance and the sound of his voice, Trooper 
Bairett believed the defendant, notwithstanding his head injury, 
was, in fact, intoxicated. 
46. Trooper Bairett told the defendant that help was on the 
way and to remain still. 
47. Trooper Bairett proceeded to the greenhouse to attempt to 
assess the injuries of those in the Saturn. 
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48 Trooper Bairett also found =>" d^;,,....,_, * who 1 . been 
ej^^ed f rom the pi ckup on the groi ind , 
^rooper Bairett returned tc I In MM I Mnldiil >il III |»i n hip. 
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IJ| l "• I* ? • 
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58. Trooper Bairett believed there was the potential for some 
of those involved in the collision to die because of their 
injuries. 
59. Trooper Bairett determined to have blood drawn from the 
defendant. 
60. Trooper Bairett did not leave the collision scene because 
of his duties. 
61. Trooper Bairett spoke to "one or more" Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's deputies ("deputies") after they responded to the 
collision scene. 
62. In particular. Trooper Bairett spoke with Sergeant Delwin 
L. Craig ("Sergeant Craig") and to Deputy Lawrence Stratford 
("Deputy Stratford"). 
63. Trooper Bairett described to Deputy Stratford what he had 
observed and his concerns. 
64. Trooper Bairett did not arrest the defendant at the 
collision scene. 
SERGEANT DELWIN L. CRAIG 
65. On November 14, 1995, at approximately 3:40 a.m., 
Sergeant Craig responded to the collision scene. 
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75. Sergeant Craig got "very close" to the defendant and 
observed that the defendant was "shaken up" and had bloodshot eyes. 
76. When he was "probably within one foot of the defendant," 
Sergeant Craig noticed the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming 
from the defendant. 
77. Sergeant Craig asked Deputy Lonnie Wilson to remain with 
the defendant. 
78. Sergeant Craig called East Patrol and requested the 
assistance of a deputy to witness the defendant's blood draw. 
79. Sergeant Craig believed he had enough information and 
evidence to justify the defendant's blood being drawn. 
Specifically, the information he had included that he 
a. saw the pickup on its roof; 
b. observed the Saturn lodged in the side of the 
greenhouse; 
c. observed the beer cans strewn about; 
d. knew that Trooper Bairett had tried to stop the 
pickup and that the pickup "took off on [Trooper 
Bairett]" and then collided with the Saturn in the 
intersection; 
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("Deputy Roberts''), arrived at the collision scene to carry out 
that responsibility. 
DEPUTY CRAIG DON ROBERTS 
84. When Deputy Roberts arrived, the defendant was secured 
onto a stretcher by straps and was waiting to be loaded into an 
ambulance. 
85. Deputy Roberts was present at the collision scene very 
briefly ("a minute or two," "just about a minute"). 
86. While he was at the scene, Deputy Roberts observed 
several patrol vehicles, ambulances and paramedics. 
87. Deputy Roberts observed the pickup and Saturn which had 
been involved in the collision. 
88. Deputy Roberts observed the debris in the immediate area. 
89. The debris included beer cans and vehicle parts. 
90. Deputy Roberts spoke with an officer on the scene, Deputy 
Jason Jones, who explained to Deputy Roberts that the driver of the 
pickup had "blown the intersection and hit the red car sending it 
into the building. And that the person [Roberts] was supposed to 
go watch, this Daniel Riggs, was the one that was driving the 
truck." 
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91. Sergeant Craig directed Deputy Roberts to go to Pioneer 
Valley Hospital and "witness" the blood draw on the defendant. 
92. Deputy Roberts then followed the ambulance to the 
hospital. 
93. Prior to November 14, 1995, Deputy Roberts had worked in 
law enforcement for the Midvale City Police Department for almost 
four years. 
94. Deputy Roberts has been with the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's office for just over a year. 
95. At the time of the collision, Deputy Roberts had training 
in the apprehension of intoxicated drivers through POST, understood 
how to use the intoxalyzer and was experienced in performing field 
sobriety tests. 
96. Deputy Roberts has made "[p]robably a couple hundred [DUI 
arrests] in the last five years." 
DEPUTY LAWRENCE STRATFORD 
97. Deputy Stratford arrived at the collision scene on 
November 14, 1995, shortly after the ambulance carrying the 
defendant left for the hospital. 
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98. Detective Stratford was responsible for heading the 
collision investigation team and "took charge" of the investigation 
when he arrived at the scene. 
99. Deputy Stratford was briefed at the scene by Trooper 
Bairett, Sergeant Craig and other law enforcement officers. 
100. Trooper Bairett described his observations and concerns 
to Deputy Stratford. 
101. Based on his briefing with Trooper Bairett, Sergeant 
Craig and other law enforcement officers, Deputy Stratford was 
aware of considerable evidence regarding the likely cause of the 
collision and the possible use of alcoholic beverages by the 
defendant. 
102. Deputy Stratford observed beer cans in the collision 
debris. 
103. Deputy Stratford observed open beer cans within the cab 
of the pickup. 
104. Although not "100 percent" certain, after his briefing 
with the law enforcement officers, Deputy Stratford had a "strong 
idea" that the defendant was the driver of the pickup. 
105. According to Sergeant Craig, Deputy Stratford ordered the 
blood draw on the defendant. 
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106. Deputy Stratford requested Sergeant Craig to send 
deputies to witness blood draws on the defendant, Michael Lambrou, 
Lonnie James, and Kevin Smithson. 
107. Michael Lambrou and Lonnie James had been in the Saturn/ 
Kevin Smithson had been in the pickup. 
108. As of November 14, 1995, Deputy Stratford was a law 
enforcement officer with the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office. 
109. As of November 14, 1995, Deputy Stratford had worked for 
the Salt Lake County Sheriff for approximately 12 years. 
110. As of November 14, 1995, Deputy Stratford was assigned to 
the Traffic Division as an investigator. 
THE DEFENDANT'S BLOOD DRAW 
111. Subsequent to the arrival of Deputy Roberts at the 
hospital, he and the state's phlebotomist, Bryan Davis ("Mr. 
Davis"), together went into the emergency room where the defendant 
lay. 
112. When Deputy Roberts and Bryan Davis entered the 
defendant's emergency room, the straps which had secured the 
defendant to the stretcher had been removed and the defendant had 
been moved from the stretcher to a hospital bed. 
113. The defendant was awake and appeared to be coherent. 
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114. Deputy Roberts told the defendant they "were there to do 
a blood draw." 
115. Deputy Roberts did not tell the defendant the blood was 
for police purposes. 
116. In response to Deputy Roberts' statement, the defendant 
voiced no objection. 
117. The defendant did not indicate that Deputy Roberts and 
Mr. Davis could proceed with the blood draw. 
118. No search warrant authorizing the blood draw was obtained 
prior to the drawing of the defendant's blood. 
119. Deputy Roberts observed that the defendant had a head 
wound and that there was blood on his head. 
120. From a distance of approximately one foot, Deputy Roberts 
smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage on the defendant's 
breath; however, he did not notice any slurring of speech by the 
defendant. 
121. Throughout the time Deputy Roberts observed the defendant 
at the hospital, the defendant was "pretty well doing everything 
that the nurses asked him to do." 
122. As time passed between 4:46 a.m. and 6:30 a.m. on 
November 14, 1995, to Deputy Roberts "[it] seemed that [the 
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defendant] got better and was more alert and was more able to move 
around and do the things that [the nurses] asked him to do." 
123. Deputy Roberts was aware that fatalities were involved in 
the collision. 
124. Deputy Roberts was aware that blood draws were also being 
performed on other individuals involved in the collision. 
125. Deputy Roberts did not arrest the defendant at Pioneer 
Valley Hospital. 
CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND STORAGE OF THE STATE-ANALYZED BLOOD 
126. Bryan Davis is a phlebotomist on contract with law 
enforcement agencies throughout Salt Lake County to draw blood from 
suspects at the request of law enforcement officers. 
127. Mr. Davis is familiar with the provisions of Section 41-
6-44 Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended. 
128. On November 14, 1995, Mr Davis was qualified and 
authorized by the Utah State Health Department pursuant to Utah law 
to perform blood draws in behalf of the State on DUI suspects and 
he had been so qualified and authorized for approximately 11 years. 
129. During the last approximately 12 years, Mr. Davis has 
performed over 9,000 evidentiary draws. 
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130. Mr. Davis testified that he consistently follows standard 
procedures in the performance/ handling and storage of evidentiary 
blood draws. 
131. In this case, Mr. Davis followed his standard, consistent 
procedures in the performance, handling and storage of the 
defendant's blood draw evidence. 
132. The procedures followed by Mr. Davis in this and his 
other evidentiary blood draws are that he 
a. obtains the blood; 
b. encloses the blood in glass vacutainer tubes; 
c. individually marks the tubes with the defendant's 
name, Mr. Davis' initials, the date of the blood 
draw and the time of the blood draw; 
d. places the tubes into an envelope which contains 
virtually the same information, along with some 
information regarding the police agency's case and 
deputies or officers involved in the accident; 
e. seals the envelope by a gum seal and tapes over the 
seal; 
f. has the officer witnessing the seal sign on the 
back of the envelope; and 
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g. maintains the envelope containing the tubes in his 
possession or under secure conditions until he can 
deliver it to the State forensic toxicologist. 
133. The tubes into which the blood is drawn contain 
preservative, or anticoagulant, agents: one tube contains sodium 
fluoride and the second contains potassium oxalate. 
134. On the morning on November 14, 1995, Mr. Davis went to 
Pioneer Valley Hospital to draw the defendant's blood. 
135. Mr. Davis did, in fact, draw the defendant's blood. 
136. Mr. Davis prepared the defendant's arm for the blood draw 
by cleansing the area with a soap and water solution. 
137. Mr. Davis stated it was "probable" he moved the 
defendant's arm out to draw the blood and then drew the blood. 
138. It is undisputed that Mr. Davis performed the blood draw 
in a reasonable and safe manner. 
139. It took Mr. Davis approximately three minutes to complete 
the blood draw. 
140. As the blood was being drawn, the defendant neither 
withdrew his arm nor voiced an objection to the procedure. 
141. At the same time Mr. Davis drew the defendant's blood for 
state-analysis, either Mr. Davis or a nurse from Pioneer Hospital 
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drew three additional tubes of the defendant's blood for his 
medical treatment. 
142. Thus, a combined total of five tubes of blood were drawn 
from the defendant: two for state-analysis and three for hospital-
analysis. 
143. The tubes of blood drawn for the State were marked with 
the defendant's name, the date and time and Mr. Davis1 initials. 
144. Mr. Davis then sealed the tubes of blood in an envelope 
and taped over the seal. 
145. Deputy Roberts signed the back of the envelope over the 
taped seal. 
14 6. After leaving the hospital, Mr. Davis placed the envelope 
containing the vials of blood drawn from the defendant in a 
container in his locked motor vehicle. 
147. The container into which Mr. Davis placed the envelope is 
a non-refrigerated cooler which Mr. Davis had positioned in his 
vehicle for the purpose of holding blood draw evidence. 
148. The cooler is not locked. 
149. Mr. Davis then drove to LDS Hospital, Cottonwood Hospital 
and the University of Utah Medical Center to perform similar blood 
draws. 
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150. Mr. Davis locked his vehicle when he exited. 
151. The container in the vehicle did not need to be 
refrigerated because the tubes into which the blood had been drawn 
contained preservatives which temporarily protect the blood against 
deterioration. 
152. According to Mr. Davis, blood protected by preservatives 
is commonly sent by mail throughout the country in unrefrigerated 
packages. 
153. Dennis Crouch, the defendant's forensic toxicologist 
expert witness ("Mr. Crouch"), agreed that blood protected by 
preservatives is often sent by mail throughout the country in 
unrefrigerated packages. 
154. The fact the defendant's blood was temporarily placed in 
the unrefrigerated cooler did not affect the accuracy of the blood 
alcohol content results. 
155. When he had performed all of the blood draws that 
morning, Mr. Davis took the envelope containing the tubes of 
defendant's blood, together with similar envelopes containing blood 
samples from the other blood draws performed that morning to his 
home where he placed them in a specifically-designated bottom 
drawer in his refrigerator. 
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156. Mr. Davis1 refrigerator and the drawer in which Mr. Davis 
stores the blood sample envelopes are not locked. 
157. Mr. Davis1 wife and children have access to the 
refrigerator drawer; however, Mr. Davis has instructed all of his 
family members never to open the drawer containing the envelopes. 
158. No food is kept in the designated drawer. 
159. Subsequently, Mr. Davis transferred the envelope holding 
the defendant's blood samples to the State Laboratory where Mr. 
Beck took custody of the blood samples. 
160. Mr. Davis testified, based on his various inspections of 
the envelope which held the defendant's blood sample, that at no 
time during which he had custody of the defendant's blood samples 
was there any indication whatsoever that the seal of the envelope 
had been tampered with or come off, that either of the tubes had 
broken or leaked, that the identifying labels on the packages had 
shifted or come off, and that when he transferred the envelope to 
Mr. Beck the envelope was in the exact same condition it was when 
the envelope was sealed at Pioneer Valley Hospital. 
161. No evidence was presented to suggest that while the blood 
was in the custody of Mr. Davis that the envelope containing the 
sealed tubes of the defendant's blood had been tampered with. 
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162. No evidence was presented to suggest any bad faith on the 
part of the State in Mr. Davis' handling of the blood sample taken 
from the defendant. 
TESTING OF THE STATE-ANALYZED BLOOD 
163. Mr. Beck personally received from Mr. Davis the sealed 
envelope containing the two tubes of defendant's blood on November 
16, 1995, at 3 p.m. 
164. Mr. Beck is employed by the Utah State Division of 
Laboratories as a toxicologist. 
165. Mr. Beck has a Bachelor of Science degree in chemistry, 
a Bachelor of Science degree in pharmacy and approximately 23 years 
of on-the-job experience. 
166. Mr. Beck is a member of the Society of Forensic 
Toxicologists and a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensics 
Toxicology. 
167. The parties stipulated that Mr. Beck is an expert for the 
purposes of the suppression hearing. 
168. Upon receipt of the defendant's blood samples, Mr. Beck 
prepared the samples for testing and then placed the samples in the 
refrigerator in the evidence room of the State Laboratory. 
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169. The evidence room is not open to the public and is locked 
unless staff are present in the room. 
170. Later in the afternoon that day at 4:55 p.m., Mr. Beck 
tested the defendant's blood samples for the presence of ethanol, 
which is normal drinking alcohol. 
171. Mr. Beck used a testing device known as a gas 
chromatograph ("GC") to analyze the defendant's blood for ethanol. 
172. The GC equipment used by Mr. Beck to analyze the 
defendant's blood is considered to be the standard machine used by 
toxicologists to determine the presence of ethanol in blood. 
173. Quality controls are used in the GC testing process to 
ensure that the equipment is working properly. 
174. Quality controls are used before, during and following 
the testing of blood samples. 
175. The quality controls used before, during and after the GC 
testing of the defendant's blood indicated that the GC equipment 
was functioning within acceptable tolerances. 
17 6. The GC equipment at the State Laboratory has 50 
carousels, which enables the analysis of multiple blood samples on 
one run. 
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177. The results of the GC analysis of each blood sample 
tested correspond to each numbered carousel in which a blood sample 
is placed. 
178. Two tests were performed on each of defendant's blood 
samples. 
179. The results of the analysis of the defendant's blood 
indicated 0.13 grams of ethanol per 100 milliliters of blood. 
CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND TESTING OF THE HOSPITAL-ANALYZED BLOOD 
180. On November 14, 1995, Cindy Sadler ("Nurse Sadler") was 
employed as a registered nurse by Pioneer Valley Hospital and was 
involved in the blood draw of the defendant. 
181. As of November 14, 1995, Nurse Sadler had an Associate 
Degree from Weber State College. 
182. Nurse Sadler has worked as a registered nurse for 
eighteen years. 
183. Nurse Sadler is not aware of a specific policy at Pioneer 
Valley Hospital regarding the analysis of alcohol in people 
involved in accidents; however, Nurse Sadler is aware that the 
hospital does ask for analysis of alcohol in the blood of people 
involved in accidents. 
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184. After Mr. Davis drew two tubes of blood for the State, 
either he or Nurse Sadler drew three more tubes for use by the 
hospital. 
185. Nurse Sadler received the hospital's three tubes of 
defendant's blood. 
186. Nurse Sadler then copied the defendant's name and 
identifying information from his hospital armband onto labels 
which, in turn, she placed on each of the three blood tubes. 
187. Nurse Sadler also placed her initials, "CS," on each of 
the three tubes. 
188. Nurse Sadler then sent the three tubes to the Pioneer 
Valley Hospital Laboratory for analysis. 
189. On November 14, 1995, Stanley R. Hardy ("Mr. Hardy") was 
employed as a medical technician in the Pioneer Valley Hospital 
Laboratory. 
190. Mr. Hardy's education, training and experience qualify 
him to perform the analysis of blood to determine the presence of 
ethyl alcohol. 
191. Mr. Hardy received the three tubes of defendant's blood 
and tested it on a Roche Mira machine. 
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192. The defendant does not challenge the chain of custody or 
the accuracy of the blood testing procedure of the defendant's 
hospital-analyzed blood, 
193. Mr. Hardy knew the two tubes contained the defendant's 
blood because the label on each tube indicating the defendant's 
name and hospital armband information matched the information on 
the defendant's order slip because the order slip also contained 
the defendant's name and identifying hospital armband information. 
194. The order slip tells him the test(s) he is to perform on 
the blood samples. 
195. Mr. Hardy also identified the initials "CS" that had been 
placed on the tubes by Nurse Sadler and his own initials, "SH, " 
that indicate who performed the test. 
196. Mr. Hardy ran the blood test on the defendant's blood. 
197. When the defendant's blood was tested, the machine was 
working properly and operating "within control." 
198. After running the test on the samples, Mr. Hardy received 
the test results and confirmed that the test results were from the 
blood drawn from the defendant. 
199. The results of the analysis of the defendant's blood 
indicated 141.7 milligrams of ethanol per deciliter of blood. 
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200. Point 7 (.7) milligrams per deciliter is the equivalent 
of 0.1417 grams per 100 milliliters. 
201. In opposition to the chain of custody, handling and 
storage procedures concerning the state-analyzed blood to which Mr. 
David and Mr. Beck testified, the defendant called as his expert 
witness, Dennis Crouch, a forensic toxicologist at the Center for 
Human Toxicology and Research. 
202. Mr. Crouch, who has impressive credentials as a forensic 
toxicologist, strongly criticized procedures like those followed by 
Mr. Davis and Mr. Beck pertaining to the defendant's blood, but 
which were put to him hypothetically by defense counsel. 
203. Among other things, Mr. Crouch testified regarding 
minimum guidelines jointly recommended by the Society of Forensic 
Toxicologists and the Toxicology Section of the American Academy of 
Forensic Sciences for laboratories engaged in medical/legal 
testing. 
204. Also according to Mr. Crouch, based on hypothetical 
questions put to him by defense counsel which were designed to 
track the procedures followed by Mr. Davis and Mr. Beck, minimum 
guidelines concerning chain of custody, security, documentation 
were not met, security procedures as posed to him were deficient, 
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distinctions between temporary and permanent storage areas of blood 
samples should have been made, blood samples should not have been 
tested in the same area in which they were stored and blood samples 
must be in the tester's line of sight or else be documented to be 
stored in a freezer or refrigerated container under lock. 
205. However, Mr. Crouch did not have any evidence to suggest 
that the tubes containing the defendant's blood had been tampered 
with in any way prior to be tested on the GC equipment. 
206. Mr. Crouch also agreed that his own lab receives blood 
mailed by U.S. mail delivery from other places in Utah that has 
been mailed in unrefrigerated containers. 
207. Finally, Mr. Crouch did not address the fact that 
notwithstanding the differences in the handling, storage and 
testing of the state-analyzed blood (which Mr. Crouch did 
criticize) and the hospital-analyzed blood procedures in this case 
(which the defendant did not challenge), the state-analyzed results 
concluded that the defendant's blood alcohol level on November 14, 
1995, was 0.13 grams of ethanol per 100 milliliters of blood, and 
that the hospital-analyzed results found that the defendant's blood 
alcohol level on November 14, 1995, was .1417 grams of ethanol per 
100 milliliters of blood. If anything, the hospital-analyzed blood 
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test results themselves underscore the accuracy of the state-
analyzed blood test results and thereby affirm the reliability of 
the State's handling, storage and testing procedures of the 
defendant's blood samples. 
STATEMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY THE DEFENDANT WHILE 
HOSPITALIZED AT THE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER 
208. Following some initial treatment and the blood draw on 
November 14, 1995, the defendant was transferred from Pioneer 
Valley Hospital to the University Medical Center ("UUMC"). 
209. Fairly soon after the defendant's admission to the UUMC 
on November 14, 1995, a UUMC representative contacted Deputy 
Stratford to tell him that the hospital had received threats 
against the defendant's life and that the hospital was concerned 
the defendant's family might remove him from the hospital against 
the hospital's wishes. 
210. In response, the defendant was provided protection by 
security guards, including deputies from the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office, until he was released from the UUMC. 
211. The guards were stationed in the defendant's room also to 
ensure that the defendant did not leave the hospital. 
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DEPUTY BRAD HUNTER 
212. From approximately 3:00 p.m. until 5:30 p.m., November 
14, 1995, Deputy Brad Hunter ("Deputy Hunter'') was assigned to 
guard the defendant in his room at the UUMC. 
213. Deputy Hunter did not go to the UUMC to interrogate the 
defendant. 
214. Deputy Hunter neither interrogated the defendant nor 
asked him any specific questions. 
215. Deputy Hunter did not advise the defendant of his rights 
per Miranda while he was stationed in the defendant's room. 
216. When Deputy Hunter, in uniform, walked into the 
defendant's room, the defendant asked him why he was there. 
217. Deputy Hunter told the defendant he was there to keep the 
defendant at the hospital because the defendant had threatened to 
leave. 
218. According to Deputy Hunter, the defendant appeared to be 
"banged up" and "mentally okay but a little tired." 
219. While Deputy Hunter was present the defendant received no 
medical attention other than visits "every so often" by a nurse to 
"give blood checks." 
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220. Deputy Hunter and the defendant had a "general 
conversation" for approximately one hour of the two and a half 
hours he was in the defendant's room, 
221. Deputy Hunter recalled three statements made by the 
defendant which he subsequently included in his report. 
222. Except as discussed in Findings of Fact Nos. 223 and 226, 
there was no discussion concerning the collision or the defendant's 
possible involvement in the collision. 
223. The first remark spontaneously made by the defendant was 
that his (the defendant's) sister had seen him (the defendant) on 
the 12 o'clock news. 
224. The remark was not made in answer to any question. 
225. Deputy Hunter responded to the remark by telling the 
defendant he (Deputy Hunter) "didn't see it" and "didn't know much 
about what happened." 
226. Subsequently, after Deputy Stratford arrived, according 
to Deputy Hunter, at one point the defendant also spontaneously 
stated that he (the defendant) and some friends had been "driving 
a stolen '94...Ford Ranger extended cab," that he had "passed a cop 
car. And when he saw the cop car somebody told him to go, so he 
sped up and got approximately 75 miles an hour and went through the 
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red light. And that's when the accident happened." The defendant 
also said that if the accident had not happened, "he probably would 
have lost the cop." 
227. Deputy Hunter neither coerced nor tricked the defendant 
into making these statements. 
228. Before Deputy Hunter left, he and Deputy Stratford were 
together in the defendant's room for approximately five minutes. 
229. Deputy Hunter knew Deputy Stratford came to the 
defendant's room to "complete the investigation." 
230. Deputy Hunter is and has been a deputy in the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's office for approximately three and a half years. 
231. Deputy Hunter was a credible witness. 
DEPUTY LAWRENCE STRATFORD 
232. Shortly before 6:00 p.m. on November 14, 1995, Deputy 
Stratford arrived at the defendant's room at the UUMC. 
233. Deputy Stratford went to the UUMC initially "to find out 
the problem with the threats" and then decided "that while [he] was 
there [he] would try and obtain [the defendant's] side of the story 
to find out [the defendant's] version of what happened." 
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234. Deputy Stratford did not advise the defendant of his 
rights per Miranda while he was present in the defendant's hospital 
room. 
235. Deputy Hunter was present in the defendant's room when 
Deputy Stratford arrived. 
236. Deputy Stratford was in uniform when he came to the 
defendant's room. 
237. When Deputy Stratford arrived, the defendant was talking 
to Deputy Hunter. 
238. Deputy Stratford asked the defendant "if he remembered 
the accident so that [Deputy Stratford] could find out [the 
defendant's] side of the story." 
239. When Deputy Stratford arrived, the room's television was 
on. After Deputy Stratford asked the defendant if he remembered 
the accident, a television news story came on about the accident. 
240. Distracted by the news story, Deputies Stratford and 
Hunter turned to listen to it. 
241. At that time, according to Deputy Stratford, the 
defendant spontaneously stated that "he knew the car was stolen 
before the officer turned his lights on and they decided to run 
from him/" "the gun was loaded and that Kevin bought it;" and that 
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"he was just taking them home and knew nothing about the burglary 
earlier," 
242. The deputies themselves had turned to watch the news 
report and were not talking to the defendant when he made these 
statements. 
243. Deputy Stratford neither coerced nor tricked the 
defendant to make any statements. 
244. Although Deputy Stratford had asked a question about 
whether the defendant could remember the accident so that Deputy 
Stratford could fill out his version of events, the statement was 
not made in response to Deputy Stratford's question. 
245. Indeed, the question was not actually responsive to the 
question asked. 
24 6. Some of Deputy Stratford's testimony conflicted with some 
of his other testimony; however, he was, nevertheless, a credible 
witness. 
DEPUTY DIRK ROESLER 
247. On November 16, 1995, Deputy Dirk Roesler ("Deputy 
Roesler") went to the UUMC to guard the defendant. 
248. On November 16, the defendant was considered by law 
enforcement to be "in custody." 
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249. Deputy Roesler did not go to the UUMC to interrogate the 
defendant. 
250. Deputy Roesler did not interrogate the defendant while he 
(Deputy Roesler) was guarding the defendant. 
251. Deputy Roesler did not advise the defendant of his 
rights per Miranda while he was in the defendant's hospital room. 
252. Deputy Roesler indicated that at times the defendant 
appeared to be heavily medicated and groggy. 
253. Nevertheless, Deputy Roesler and the defendant were able 
to converse casually. 
254. They did not discuss the accident nor the defendant's 
part therein except as follows in Findings 255, 256 and 257. 
255. At one point, the defendant spontaneously expressed to 
Deputy Roesler that he feared for his (defendant's) safety and 
asked if there was anything Deputy Roesler could do to arrange for 
confinement outside of the county. 
256. In response, Deputy Roesler advised the defendant to 
consult with his attorney concerning the conditions of his 
confinement. 
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257. Notwithstanding Deputy Roesler's advice, the defendant 
continued to discuss the site of his confinement and then 
volunteered the statement, "I did it, I'm guilty as hell." 
258. Deputy Roesler neither coerced nor tricked the defendant 
to make any statement. 
259. Deputy Roesler has been in law enforcement with the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's office since October 1991. 
260. Deputy Roesler was a credible witness. 
THE DEFENDANT'S MEDICAL CONDITION AND WHETHER ANY 
STATEMENTS BY HIM WERE MADE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY 
261. While at the scene of the collision, the defendant was 
partially pinned under the truck and was not free to leave. 
262. Trooper Bairett had considerable probable cause evidence 
against the defendant to believe the defendant had been driving 
under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. 
2 63. Trooper Bairett had considerable evidence to believe that 
the defendant caused the accident and that the accident was likely 
to cause at least one death. 
264. To Trooper Bairett the defendant appeared to be in shock. 
264. In view of all of the circumstances, Trooper Bairett 
asked the defendant questions which were likely to elicit 
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admissions from the defendant without first informing him of his 
Miranda rights. 
265. While at the UUMC, the defendant received medical 
treatment for his injuries resulting from the collision. 
266. At times during his hospitalization, the defendant 
appeared to be tired, groggy and medicated, it appears that 
throughout the day of November 14, his state of alertness improved 
and he was "pretty well" able to do what the nurses asked him to 
do. 
267. At the time the defendant allegedly made his 
incriminating statements to the officers, his medical condition 
did not appear to render him unable to make the statements to the 
officers knowingly and voluntarily. 
268. To the contrary, according to the officers, at each time 
the defendant volunteered one of these statements, the defendant 
had been engaged in casual conversations. 
2 69. Deputies Hunter, Stratford or Roesler neither tricked nor 
coerced the defendant into making incriminating statements. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes 
the following as a matter of law: 
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1. Trooper Bairett's questions to the defendant at the scene 
of the collision at which time the defendant was partially pinned 
under the truck and in shock and which were made in the absence of 
a Miranda warning went beyond the investigatory stage and, 
therefor, are suppressed. 
2. The defendant should have been advised of his rights per 
Miranda when Trooper Bairett proceeded to interrogate the defendant 
about his driving the pickup and why he had run from Trooper 
Bairett. 
3. The defendant, despite his actions and lack of 
objections, did not expressly consent to the blood draw by Mr. 
Davis. 
4. Because no search warrant authorizing the blood draw had 
been obtained prior to the blood draw and because the defendant was 
not under arrest, three factors must be satisfied for the blood 
draw to pass constitutional muster: first, the draw itself must be 
performed in a reasonable and safe manner. With regard to this 
factor, it is undisputed that the draw was performed in a 
reasonable and safe fashion. 
Second, probable cause must be exist for the draw and known to 
the officer (s) who directs that a blood draw be conducted. 
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Third, exigent circumstances must be present to conduct the 
search without a search warrant. 
5. Trooper Bairett, Sergeant Craig and Deputy Stratford 
each had probable cause to believe the defendant had operated the 
pickup while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage and, 
thus, could direct a blood draw. 
7. Trooper Bairett, having probable cause to believe the 
defendant had operated the pickup while under the influence of 
alcohol, did radio Dispatch and request help, including someone to 
help with the defendant's blood draw. 
8. Deputy Roberts, the law enforcement official who 
witnessed the blood draw, also had independent probable cause to 
order the procedure. 
9. To prevent the dissipation of evidence of ethanol in an 
individual's system is a recognized exigent circumstance. 
10. The chain of custody of the blood drawn by Mr. Davis and 
maintained by the State of Utah was not defective; the blood tubes 
had not, prior to being tested, been tampered with in any way and 
the State did not exhibit any bad faith in the handling, storage or 
testing of the blood. 
v 1/ \l v 1/ ft 
STATE V. RIGGS PAGE FORTY-FIVE FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
11. The chain of custody of the state-analyzed blood evidence 
was sufficient. 
12. The handling, storage and testing procedures for the 
state-analyzed blood did not affect the accuracy of the blood 
samples. 
13. The testing procedures for the defendant's state-analyzed 
blood were appropriate, accurate and reliable. The testing 
equipment is standard for blood alcohol testing and the machine was 
calibrated and working properly before, during and after the test. 
14. The State established an appropriate chain of custody of 
the hospital-analyzed blood, and the defendant does not contest 
this chain of custody. 
15. It is unclear whether it was Mr. Davis or Nurse Sadler 
who drew the three additional tubes of the defendant's blood. 
However, under the totality of the circumstances, the reason these 
three additional tubes of blood were drawn related solely to the 
defendant's medical treatment and, therefor, does not constitute an 
unconstitutional search of the defendant. 
16. Rule 506(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence is an exception 
to the physician-patient privilege and provides that no 
physician-patient privilege exists as to information obtained by 
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examination of the patient relevant to an issue of the physical 
condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition 
is an element of any claim in any proceedings in which any party 
relies upon the condition as an element of the claim. In the 
instant case, the State of Utah relies on the defendant's blood 
alcohol content as an element of its claims that he committed three 
counts of Criminal Homicide, Automobile Homicide. Because the 
blood draw itself was a constitutional search, the results of the 
hospital-analyzed blood testing are otherwise admissible under Rule 
506(d). 
17. The defendant was in custody at all times while he was at 
the UUMC. 
18. Although the defendant could have been arrested prior to 
7:30 p.m., November 16, 1995, the investigation was ongoing prior 
to that time. 
19. The law enforcement officers knew the defendant was to 
remain in the hospital and that he was not going to leave the 
hospital. They were not obligated to arrest the defendant prior to 
his actual arrest. 
20. None of the conversations between the defendant and 
Deputies Hunter, Stratford and Roesler constituted interrogations 
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nor did the deputies employ coercion or trickery to elicit 
incriminating statements from the defendant. 
21. All of the incriminating statements made by the defendant 
to Deputies Hunter, Stratford and Roesler were spontaneous and 
voluntary. 
22. At the times the defendant made his incriminating 
statements to Deputies Hunter, Stratford and Roesler, he made the 
statements knowingly and voluntarily; his medical condition did not 
render him incapable of making those statements knowingly and 
voluntarily. 
DATED this 28th day of June, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Trial Court's Oral Ruling on Motion to Suppress 
1 And I would suggest to you that he also knew the results of 
2 the blood draw before he was booked into jail. In fact, from 
3 the testimony he stated that he did know the results of the 
4 blood draw before booking him into jail. 
5 And also Deputy Hunter backs up the fact that they 
6 didn't know who the driver of the truck was. Hunter stated 
7 that Stratford relieved him at the hospital on November 14th 
8 at 6 o'clock. And he said that Stratford was coming over to 
9 the hospital to continue investigating the accident and also 
10 who was driving the truck. I asked him, Were they still 
11 investigating who was driving the truck? Yes. They didn't 
12 know who was driving the truck; that was still under 
13 investigation. 
14 So what we have with Roberts is that he knew that 
15 an accident occurred. There is a question about whether he 
16 knew Danny was the driver because that was still in dispute. 
17 So the only thing Roberts knows is that an accident had 
18 occurred. 
19 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
20 I don't believe that will be necessary. 
21 I am prepared to make some rulings on the motions 
22 that have been argued. I have heard from the State. I have 
23 heard from the defense, and I have given the defense 
24 considerable more time than the State. But I have also read 
25 the memoranda from all counsel and all counsel have touched 
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1 on the arguments that are also in the briefs. So I am 
2 considering those as well* 
3 With regard to the statements made by Mr. Riggs, 
4 there are four individuals to whom statements were made. 
5 Trooper Bairett first of all. These are all analyzed under 
6 the Carner factors, and I won't repeat those here, but 
7 counsel have cited those in their briefs and I am familiar 
8 with those and they were recently reaffirmed by the Utah 
9 Supreme Court. 
10 Absolutely under the Fifth Amendment no person 
11 shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against 
12 himself. A necessary element of compulsory self-
13 incrimination is some kind of compulsion. That's in Hoffa 
14 v. U.S.. a Supreme Court opinion. 
15" Obviously Miranda v. Arizona is the landmark 
16 case addressing police interrogation methods. And detailed 
17 and under Miranda and its progeny, a warning must be 
18 administered to a suspect who is the subject of a custodial 
19 interrogation in order to dispel the compulsion inherent in 
20 custodial surroundings. So keeping all these principles in 
21 mind, the Court addresses each statement. 
22 Let me digress for just a moment, that I will 
23 obviously overlook things in this bench ruling that may be 
24 consistent with evidence at trial. And in preparing the 
25 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, I think the 
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1 prevailing party on any issue is entitled to include evidence 
2 which is consistent with the Court's ruling. And then I will 
3 decide whether I make the finding or whether I don't make the 
4 finding. 
5 But in any event, the circumstances were that 
6 Trooper Bairett had first observed the truck. Without going 
7 into all the details about what happened initially, the truck 
8 at a point fled from Trooper Bairett reaching speeds 
9 approximately 75 miles an hour, far in excess of what was the 
10 limit in the area. And Trooper Bairett was following this 
11 vehicle, trying to catch up with it, saw the red light ahead, 
12 thought that the vehicle might stop or at least substantially 
13 slow down. And the brake lights went on temporarily and then 
14 the vehicle, the truck, went through the red light. And the 
15 other vehicle, the Saturn vehicle, was coming through on a 
16 green light from the perpendicular and a collision occurred. 
17 And Trooper Bairett saw all this. In fact, he had already 
18 put on his video recording device in his car. I don't know 
19 whether this was captured on that video device or not — I sun 
20 getting a nod yes. I just didn't happen to remember. 
21 In any event, so Trooper Bairett drove up. He 
22 went first to the truck which was on its back. And one 
23 individual I believe at that point was trying to get out, 
24 either then or a little bit later. But in any event, the 
25 person Trooper Bairett identified as the driver of the 
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1 vehicle, having previously been next to the vehicle at a 
2 light, was on the passenger side and that he was partially 
3 pinned under the truck. 
4 He then went to the Saturn and the Saturn car. 
5 The force of the collision threw the Saturn into a building. 
6 And the Trooper checked on the people who were in the Saturn 
7 and then came back to the truck, then went to check another 
8 person who had been flung from the car in a grassy area. 
9 Then Trooper Bairett came back. 
10 At that point Trooper Bairett asked — during all 
11 of this he had arrested, he had actually handcuffed — maybe 
12 not actually arrested but he handcuffed the first person who 
13 was out of the truck who was making motions to leave. 
14 Trooper Bairett also requested other help and also made a 
15 call that help would be needed for blood draws. There was a 
16 lot of debris around including beer cans, some opened — or 
17 most of which were closed, but my recollection is some of 
18 them may have been opened. 
19 Trooper Bairett told the driver of the car, he 
20 spoke to Mr. Riggs and he told him that he should lie still 
21 until medical personnel arrived. He said that, he referred 
22 to the passenger that he had handcuffed as "in custody." And 
23 then during this process he asked him some questions 
24 including who was driving, why was he driving, why was 
25 Mr. Riggs driving and why did he run from him. And I took 
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1 from that, in his car, when the truck tried to run away from 
2 Trooper Bairett. 
3 Now, looking at the Carney factors at the scene 
4 of the accident, Mr. Riggs was partially pinned underneath 
5 the truck. He had been told to lie still for medical 
6 treatment reasons. Trooper Bairett evidently saw that he had 
7 been injured on his head; he didn't know the extent of his 
8 injuries. 
9 It's a little unclear at what point other officers 
10 arrived on the scene in relation to when these statements 
11 were made or these questions were made. There certainly was 
12 testimony from Detective Craig that they were treating this 
13 as a crime scene. In fact, deputies were assigned to stand 
14 at particular points and he referred to some individuals as 
15 arrestees. He said that one arrestee tried to flee and that 
16 there was a deputy actually sitting right next to him, and 
17 that I believe was the passenger. (Page 43 of the 
18 transcript). 
19 In any event, there was some indicia of arrest 
20 because there was an officer very close by. No testimony 
21 that the officers who were in the particular areas were 
22 within eyesight of Mr. Riggs; I can't really draw conclusions 
23 as to that. But there was one passenger who was handcuffed. 
24 And these folks were referred to as arrestees. Certainly 
25 there was in the minds of some of the officers at the scene, 
0 0 1 2 5 f' 61 
1 there were indicia of arrest. 
2 The questions that were asked were questions. 
3 There were only a few questions. It wasn't a full-blown kind 
4 of interrogation. The constitutional law as I understand it, 
5 which has been cited by counsel, include that — are as 
6 counsel have been discussing here today. 
7 This Court doesn't write statutes. This Court, as 
8 other judges, is compelled to take oaths to apply and follow 
9 the constitution as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court and 
10 others. And I, therefore, am compelled to follow the law 
11 regardless of how that comes out. 
12 As to Trooper Bairett, as I understand the law, I 
13 believe that the questions that were asked, who was driving, 
14 that question concerned me because Trooper Bairett said he 
15 knew who was driving. And while it's an investigatory kind 
16 of thing, a question, it's calling for an admission, I think, 
17 where Trooper Bairett said he knew who was driving. 
18 There was a question, why was he driving and why 
19 did he run from him. I think under the circumstances, under 
20 Carner particularly, that there was some interrogation of 
21 Mr. Riggs that went beyond mere investigation because it was 
22 in the context where there were other indicia of arrest, 
23 where Mr. Riggs was clearly, I'll use the term "not free.to 
24 leave," knowing that that's not the test; the test is the 
25 Carner test. But even if he had been able to get out from 
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1 under the truck, there was another officer there who was 
2 keeping somebody else right at the scene. There were other 
3 officers around. 
4 Accordingly, the defendant's motion is granted as 
5 to that particular statement. And the statement there was 
6 that he was driving because the others were too drunk to 
7 drive• 
8 As to Detective Stratford, in that situation the 
9 site was in the hospital. There had been guards there for 
10 some time. First they were ordered there to make sure that 
11 the people — because the hospital had indicated that there 
12 were people threatening Mr. Riggs and Mr. Riggs family, 
13 evidently, had made some — had caused the hospital to 
14 believe that they might try to remove Mr. Riggs from the 
15 hospital. So the guards were there to make sure that there 
16 were no problems, to protect Mr. Riggs, and to insure that he 
17 did not leave the hospital or at least was not taken out of 
18 the hospital by Mr. Riggs1 family. 
19 With regard to the statements that were made, at 
20 that point I don't think there is really any dispute that the 
21 investigation had focused on Mr. Riggs as a possible suspect 
22 or that he was a suspect and that the investigation was 
23 focused on him. Clearly there was some objective indicia of 
24 arrest, namely: that there was a guard there. And at that 
25 point, by the time Mr. Stratford appeared, he was there also 
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1 to make sure that Mr. Riggs was not leaving. 
2 Now, Detective Stratford made some questions 
3 initially or proposed some questions to Mr. Riggs initially, 
4 did he remember the accident. There was no responses there 
5 that are in dispute here. The statement that is made that is 
6 at dispute is that Mr. Riggs knew that the vehicle was 
7 stolen. At the time that this was made, no questions were 
8 being put to Mr. Riggs. Mr. Stratford was there, not a long 
9 period of time, but there were no questions before Mr. Riggs. 
10 And, in fact, at that time Mr. Stratford was speaking with 
11 the other detective who was there. 
12 Statements that are volunteered are — well, 
13 voluntary statements made, spontaneous statements made by a 
14 suspect may be admissible if, in fact, they are spontaneous 
15 statements. Given a review of the entire context of the 
16 discussion, as I assess all of this, it is my finding that 
17 this was a spontaneous statement. And that, therefore, the 
18 statement is admissible at trial. 
19 As to Detective Hunter — and I may be getting 
20 their titles wrong but I will call them Detective Hunter and 
21 Detective Roesler — Detective Hunter was a guard in the 
22 room. He did not interrogate Mr. Riggs. It was in the 
23 hospital. It was at a time he was sent there for the reasons 
24 that I discussed previously. And I think it can be said that 
25 Mr. Riggs could not have gotten up and left that room, that 
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1 Detective Hunter would not have permitted that to happen. In 
2 other words, if Mr. Riggs tried to leave the hospital, I have 
3 no doubt that Detective Hunter would have prevented him from 
4 leaving. 
5 Under the circumstances, the investigators had 
6 focused their investigation on him. The guard was present. 
7 That is indicia for arrest. They had talked for a period of 
8 time. Frankly, I found Detective Hunter to be a credible 
9 witness. I have considered the arguments that have been made 
10 about Detective Hunter, but Detective Hunter was in my 
11 opinion a credible witness. And I do not believe he was 
12 interrogating in any way Mr. Riggs at the time that Mr. Riggs 
13 made the statement that he knew the car was stolen and that 
14 he would have lost the cop but for the accident. And that 
15 there wasn't a scene — I am not persuaded that the 
16 atmosphere was such that there was an element of compulsion 
17 on the part of Mr. Riggs in making the spontaneous statement. 
18 That there was not an atmosphere of interrogation or that the 
19 circumstances were such or the discussion was such that the 
20 officer — or that it was reasonable or likely — their 
21 discussion was reasonably or likely to elicit incriminating 
22 statements from Mr. Riggs. And accordingly, the Court denies 
23 the Motion in Limine as to those statements made to Detective 
24 Hunter. 
25 As to Detective Roesler, again the Court found 
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1 this detective to be credible. I don't consider the comment 
2 about the log, the hospital log. I am aware of that. But 
3 nevertheless — and I have also considered the fact that 
4 Detective Roesler did not recall a specific conversation 
5 other than the conversation that Mr. Riggs or the statement 
6 that he made that he did it, he was as guilty as hell. That 
7 Detective Roesler struck me as an individual who had focused 
8 on what, to him, was the single most important comment made. 
9 And that the nature of their conversation before 
10 was very casual and it was not reasonably or likely to elicit 
11 incriminating responses from Mr. Riggs. That this actually 
12 came up first, what about the jail, you know; he was worried 
13 about going to the Salt Lake County Jail. Perhaps could the 
14 officer do something else. 
15 Well, then the officer actually stated, and I 
16 found it to be completely credible that he actually advised 
17 Mr. Riggs to talk to his attorney and thereby discourage 
18 Mr. Riggs from making further statements like that. And it 
19 was after that that Mr. Riggs made the statement, "I did it, 
20 I'm as guilty as hell.91 So I do not believe that is 
21 inappropriate in any way. And I find that there was no 
22 interrogation or an atmosphere created that was reasonably 
23 calculated or likely to lead to incriminating statements 
24 being made by Mr. Riggs. 
25 Now, as to the voluntariness of this because of 
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1 his medical condition, the claim essentially is that these 
2 were not voluntary because, first of all, he had made some 
3 statements because of his head jury and also because of his 
4 subsequent medication. This is a subject and fodder for 
5 cross examination. I think I do not find anything as a 
6 matter of law to justify a ruling that this was involuntary 
7 for those reasons. I think those are fact issues that need 
8 to be presented to the jury. 
9 With regard to the blood draw, my understanding of 
10 the law is that in a situation like this where there are many 
11 individuals, it's a complicated, extensive investigation, 
12 there were several vehicles and officers at the scene, that 
13 it need not be only the searching officer — in other words, 
14 the officer who was actually at the hospital who has been 
15 instructed to go there — who must have probable cause. 
16 And I frankly did not focus on Detective Roberts, 
17 what he knew. I would be happy to read the Dorsey case ~ 
18 in fact, I want to read the Dorsey case — and I will enter 
19 a supplemental ruling as to him when I have read the Dorsey 
20 case. And then I will go through and look very specifically 
21 at the probable cause, if any exists, as to Detective 
22 Roberts, if after reading that case I am persuaded that it 
23 must be Detective Roberts who must have probable cause to 
24 proceed with the draw. 
25 There is no dispute that Detective Roberts was 
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ADDENDUM D 
Flight Instruction 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^°> 
The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after 
the commission of a crime or after that person is accused of a 
crime that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to 
establish the defendant's guilt. However, such flight, if 
proved, may be considered by you in light of all other proven 
facts in the case in determining guilt or innocence. 
Although consciousness of guilt may be inferred from flight, 
it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime 
charged, and there may be reasons for flight fully consistent 
with innocence. Therefore, whether or not evidence of flight 
shows a consciousness of guilt and the significance, if any, to 
be attached to any such evidence are matters exclusively within 
the province of the jury. 
0 0 0 70 8 
